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A SIGNALLING-BASED THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT
TO RELATIONSHIPS
LUÍS VASCONCELOSy
Abstract. In this paper I present signalling as an explanation for how and why parties
commit to relationships when they initially contract about the terms of those relationships.
Two forms of contractual commitment to a relationship are considered: a promise to trade
in the future (contracted quantity); and a promise not to trade with anyone else (contracted
exclusivity). A party is said to commit more to a relationship if it commits initially to trade
a higher quantity and/or to a higher level of exclusivity. I characterize equilibrium contracts
and therefore commitment. Both the ability to signal information through an exclusivity
commitment and whether the informed party commits more to the relationship when the
relationship is more likely to succeed depend on the source of the asymmetry of information.
Keywords: Contractual commitment, signalling, informed principal.
JEL Classication: D2, D8, L14, J41.
1. Introduction
Partiesinitial commitment to relationships may vary considerably from one case to an-
other. For example, in the academic world, while universities often hire scholars o¤ering them
a tenured position, sometimes universities also hire scholars under a non-tenure contract that
may be extended later on. Similarly, in the case of vertical relationships, while manufac-
turers often sell their products to consumers through many retailers, it is also common for
manufacturers to concede exclusivity to one retailer. Such exclusivity contracts often take
the specic form of exclusive territories. Finally, also in the case of vertical relationships,
producers frequently write contracts with a given supplier pre-ordering almost all of their
needs of a specic input they will use in the future, while in some other cases they follow a
more conservative approach by initially agreeing on more modest supply contracts that may
be revised upward later on.
A few explanations for how parties initially commit (i.e. at the ex-ante contracting stage)
to a relationship have been put forward in the literature. For example, the hold up literature
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highlights that a buyer may commit to trade a high quantity (or exclusively) with a supplier
to provide the supplier with incentives to invest in relationship-specic investment (e.g., Edlin
and Reichelstein, 1996; De Meza and Selvaggi, 2007). Similarly, in situations where agents
are not risk neutral, parties may commit ex-ante to trade a high (or a low) quantity so
as to achieve e¢ cient risk allocation (e.g., Chung, 1991). In this paper, I present another
explanation for how parties initially commit to a relationship: signalling information about
the value of the relationship to the other party. The theory developed in the paper o¤ers
clear predictions on how parties commit ex-ante to relationships. In particular, it highlights
which forms of commitment parties may use to signal information depending on the type of
private information they have, as well as circumstances under which they will commit more
(or less) to a relationship.
Instead of analyzing one of the specic examples mentioned above, I consider a more styl-
ized model of contracting under asymmetric information. Specically, I consider a situation
where two parties, a principal (e.g., a buyer) and an agent (e.g., a supplier), contract on the
terms of a future transaction, knowing that the principal may later wish to trade with an
external party instead. At the contracting stage, the value of trade between the principal and
the agent is still uncertain. So is the value of trade between the principal and the external
party. However, the principal is better informed than the agent about these values. For
example, a rm may know better its own valuation of a good or service than the supplier
of that good or service; or the rm may have a better idea on the value of trading with an
alternative supplier in the future. At a later stage, before trade occurs, the values of trade are
realized and observed by the principal and the agent. At that moment they may renegotiate
the initial contract if it prescribes an ine¢ cient level of trade. Despite renegotiation, the
initial contract is important as it determines the default positions of the principal and agent
during renegotiation and, consequently, the distribution of surplus.
The paper focuses on situations where agreeing initially with the agent on a contract, as
opposed to simply waiting to trade later with the external party, involves a basic trade-o¤ for
the principal: it increases the (expected) total surplus from trade, but it also implies a loss
of some of the principals full bargaining power to the agent in future negotiations. When
two parties agree on a future transaction, they often begin interacting so as to prepare for it.
For example, after agreeing on a transaction, manufacturers and their suppliers frequently
work together on the potential customization of the good, planning delivery conditions, or
on eventual adjustments in their production processes. Because of such preparation, their
transaction may create more value than a transaction with an external party (e.g., a trans-
action on the spot market). This is captured in the paper by assuming that if a contract is
signed, the principal can (potentially) trade with the agent or with the external party, with
the value of trade between the principal and agent being possibly higher than that between
the principal and the external party; and that if a contract is not signed the principal can
only trade with the external party. But another implication of agreeing on a contract and
of such pre-trade interactions is that they often allow some learning about the other party
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in the relationship, which may shift partiesbargaining power in future negotiations. For
example, a supplier may learn how important timely delivery of the good or service is to
the manufacturer, or may even learn about negotiation techniques usually employed by the
manufacturer.1 The increase in the agents bargaining power means that the agent appro-
priates some of the renegotiation surplus when renegotiating a contract that turns out to be
ine¢ cient ex-post. This generates a problem of rent extraction for the principal when she
negotiates the initial contract with the agent. A problem that becomes intricate because she
has private information on the value of the relationship.
I analyze how the principal designs the initial contract, in particular, how she commits
ex-ante to the relationship with the agent so as to transmit information to the agent about
the value of their relationship and appropriate more of the rents created by the relationship.
The principal can commit to the relationship in two ways: by promising ex-ante to trade a
given quantity with the agent (contracted quantity) and/or by promising not to trade with the
external party in the future (contracted exclusivity). The way in which the principal commits
to the relationship depends on the type of private information she has. Three di¤erent types
of private information are considered in the paper.
Suppose rst the principals private information is about the principals value of trading
with the agent. When the principal is a buyer and the agent is a supplier, for example,
this corresponds to the situation where the buyer is better informed than the supplier about
her valuation of the suppliers input. I show that the principal commits initially to trade a
higher quantity with the agent when she expects a higher value of trading with the agent. By
doing so, the principal signals that the relationship is likely to create a high value, leading
the agent to accept a contract that is more favorable to the principal. In fact, by choosing
contracted quantity appropriately, the principal appropriates all the surplus generated by the
relationship. A high contracted quantity credibly signals a high valuation of trade because it
is more costlyto a principal whose valuation of trade with the agent is low to commit ex-
ante to trade a higher quantity with the agent than it is to a principal whose valuation of trade
with the agent is high. This holds even if the contract can be renegotiated. Everything else
equal in the contract, a higher contracted quantity leaves the principal in a weaker bargaining
position (which is determined by the initial contract) in the event of a renegotiation when her
value of trade with the agent is low than when it is high. In this case, the principal commits
more to the relationship (i.e., commits to trade a higher quantity with the agent) when their
relationship creates more value.
Suppose now the principals private information is about the agents value of trading with
the principal. As an example of such a situation, consider a buyer (the principal) contracting
1The idea that partiesbargaining power may evolve during a relationship is not new. Williamson (1985)
refers to the change in bargaining positions that may occur when parties make relationship-specic investments
as the Fundamental Transformation. Because of this transformation, even the initial winner of a bidding
competition may thereafter enjoy an advantage over rival suppliers. While investments by parties are not
explicitly considered and modeled in this paper, they could eventually be another explanation for the change
in the agents bargaining power.
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with a new supplier (the agent) about the delivery of a specic input that the buyer needs.
The buyer may have better information than the new supplier about the production cost of
the input. This may be because of the buyers past experience with other suppliers of that
(or similar) inputs, or because the buyer used to produce the input and is now outsourcing
its production. In this case, the principal commits ex-ante to trade a lower quantity when
she expects the agents value of trade with her to be higher. This is because a commitment to
trade a high quantity with the agent is more costly to the principal when the agents value of
trade is high than when it is low. Even when the initial contract is renegotiated, everything
else equal in the contract, a higher contracted quantity leaves the agent in a better position
during renegotiation when his value of trade with the principal is higher. Interestingly, in
contrast with the previous case, the principal commits less to the relationship (i.e., commits
to trade a lower quantity) when their relationship is expected to create more value.
These two cases constitute what is referred in the paper as the case of private internal
information (as they concern private information about valuations of trade that are internal
to the relationship). In both, a commitment by the principal to trade exclusively with the
agent is totally ine¤ective as an instrument to signal information. This is because contracted
exclusivity a¤ects only the principals ability to trade with the external party in the future.
Thus, when the principal has no private information on the value of trade with the external
party, a commitment to trade exclusively with the agent cannot convey any of her private
information. In fact, contractibility of exclusivity has no e¤ect on the set of equilibrium
payo¤s of the principal and the agent. This is not the case, however, when the principal has
private information about the value of trading with external parties.
When the principals private information is about the principals value of trading with the
external party, a commitment by the principal to trade exclusively with the agent, or to
trade a high quantity with the agent, or both, constitutes a credible signal of a low expected
value of trade with the external party. This is because it is more costly to the principal
to give away the possibility of trading with the external party (either directly through an
exclusivity contract or through a contract where the principal allocates a large share of her
trade capacityto trade with the agent) when she expects to have good external parties to
trade with in the future than when she expects the opposite. Again, this holds even if the
initial contract needs to be renegotiated. In equilibrium, the principal commits more to the
relationship (through a higher contracted quantity, a higher exclusivity level, or both) when
she expects a lower value of trade with the external party. Thus, as in the case where the
principal has private information about her value of trading with the agent, the principal
commits more to the relationship when the incremental value of the relationship is higher.
The asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent plays a crucial role
in these results. If the principal and the agent have the same information about the trade
valuations when they initially contract about the transaction, the initial commitment of
the principal to the relationship is fully indeterminate in equilibrium. Any combination
of contracted quantity and contracted exclusivity can arise in equilibrium. Regardless of
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contracted quantity and exclusivity and regardless of parties common information about
trade valuations, the principal can always extract all the expected surplus from trade through
an up-front transfer. This is not possible when the principal has private information on the
value of the relationship. In this case, the maximum transfer the agent is willing to accept
depends on his beliefs about the value of relationship, which may depend on the type of
contract o¤ered by the principal.
The results in the paper are important because they o¤er clear predictions on how parties
commit ex-ante to relationships. They are also important because they may have implications
for competition policy. Exclusive contracts have received much attention from competition
authorities because of the concern that they may be used to reduce entry and competition in
the market, both of which may reduce e¢ ciency and total welfare. The economics literature
has shown that there are indeed circumstances in which this can happen, validating such
concerns. For example, Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that an incumbent seller and a
buyer may write a contract specifying a damage fee that the buyer has to pay the seller if
she later trades with an entrant (a form of exclusive contract) so as to extract surplus from
the entrant. Such contracts may deter entry of a more e¢ cient entrant than the incumbent.
Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000a) show that when there are economies
of scale, an incumbent can protably deter entry by writing exclusive contracts with (only)
some customers. By monopolizing part of the customers through exclusivity, the incumbent
actually monopolizes the entire market through the exclusion of competitors. Exclusivity
contracts can also be used to reduce competition directly. For example, a manufacturer may
concede exclusivity in the distribution of its products to a retailer so as to reduce competition
in the ratail market (and achieve higher prots). Exclusivity here serves as a commitment
device. Without exclusivity, once the retailer agrees on a contract, the manufacturer may
have an incentive to start selling through other retailers, which in equilibrium leads to more
competition and lower prots (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990; OBrien and Sha¤er, 1992; and
McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). And exclusivity contracts between manufacturers and retailers
(or distributors) may also be used to reduce competition between manufacturers (e.g., Rey
and Stiglitz, 1995; Piccolo and Reisinger, 2011).
But arguments in favor of exclusive contracts have also been put forward. The most
prominent has been that they may enhance e¢ ciency by increasing investment incentives.
For example, a manufacturer may concede an exclusive territory to a retailer so as to provide
the retailer with the right incentives to invest in retailer services that would otherwise be
eroded by intra-brand competition. Similarly, a retailer may sell only the products of one
manufacturer to increase the manufacturers investment in activities (e.g., advertising) that
attracts costumers to the retailers shop (see, e.g., Segal and Whinston, 2000b, for an analysis
of the e¤ect of exclusive contracts on investments and welfare).2 Thus, there is a long and
2Other arguments in favor of exclusive contracts (and exclusive territories) include that they can prevent
ine¢ cient entry, and that by generating enough rents to a retailer they may improve incentives for maintaining
a reputation.
6 VASCONCELOS
unsettled debate on the pros and cons of exclusive contracts and on whether they should
be allowed by courts or not. The present paper contributes to this debate by highlighting a
new motive why rms may (wish to) sign exclusive contracts, which is not anti-competitive.
Firms may want to sign exclusive contracts simply to signal a low outside option and obtain
a more favorable deal. Thus, the results in this paper reinforce the idea that the application
by courts of the rule of reason when deciding on the legality of exclusive contracts, as is
currently done in the US and in the EU, constitutes perhaps a better approach than simply
seeing exclusive contracts as negative and systematically prohibiting them.
Like this paper, other articles in the literature have considered situations where the party
that designs the contract has private information and have analyzed how that information
a¤ects the contracts terms. In a more applied strand of the literature, Aghion and Bolton
(1987), Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Spier (1992) are examples. Aghion and Bolton
(1987) analyze how an incumbent seller may use stipulated damages (or contract duration)
when contracting with a buyer to signal the probability of entry of another seller.3 The
analysis in the present paper di¤ers from that in Aghion and Bolton (1987) in two aspects.
First, in the present paper, it is the informed party and contract designer (the principal)
that has the possibility to trade with an external party in the future, not the uninformed
party. Second, the present paper analyzes a setting with ex-post renegotiation.4 Aghion and
Hermalin (1990) show that signalling through the terms of a contract may lead to welfare
losses. The authors use this result to argue that imposing restrictions on private contracts may
improve welfare. Spier (1992) shows that asymmetric information may lead to contractual
incompleteness. Specically, that contractual incompleteness may signal information in the
presence of transaction costs. More recently, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and Martimort and
Sand-Zantman (2006) analyze the interaction between signalling information through the
contract and using it to incentivize e¤ort; and Vasconcelos (2014) analyses the interaction
between contractual signalling and using the contract to provide incentives for relationship-
specic investment in a situation of hold-up.
A more theoretical strand of the literature has analyzed the contracting problem faced by
the informed principal in a general framework (e.g., Myerson, 1983; Maskin and Tirole, 1990,
1992; Beaudry and Poitevin, 1993; Mylovanov and Tröger, 2014; Balkenborg and Makris,
2015). Although the setting in the present paper is more applied, it is akin to that in Maskin
and Tirole (1992), with the di¤erence that parties renegotiate contractual outcomes that are
ine¢ cient ex-post. Contract renegotiation implies that the sum of the payo¤s of the principal
and agent is always identical to e¢ cient total surplus and independent of the initial contract
signed by the parties.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the model. In Section 3, I derive
expected payo¤s given an initial contract and dene probability of success of the relationship.
3See Ziss (1996) for a more detailed summary and a comment on the analysis in Aghion and Bolton (1987).
4Spier and Whinston (1995) consider a setting similar to that in Aghion and Bolton (1987) with renegoti-
ation. They focus on the case of symmetric information contracting.





Principal and agent renegotiate
initial contract
Principal trades with
agent or with external
party
Stage 1 Stage 2
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
In Section 4, I characterize equilibrium contracts and commitment for each of the di¤erent
types of private information. In Section 5, I discuss a natural extension of the baseline model.
In Section 6, I present concluding remarks.
2. Model
Players and Sequence of Events. A principal (e.g., a buyer) and an agent (e.g., a
supplier) contract on the terms of a future transaction. Both know that ex-post the principal
has the possibility of instead trading with another (external) agent. Specically, there are
two stages. At the beginning of the rst stage the principal and the agent meet and contract
about a transaction that is supposed to occur in stage two. During stage one, which may also
involve preparation for trade by the principal and the agent (that is not explicitly modelled
here), trade valuations are uncertain and the principal is better informed than the agent
about them. At the beginning of stage two, the values of trade between the principal and the
agent and between the principal and the external party become known. After learning these
values, the principal and the agent may renegotiate the initial contract. They may decide
to trade a quantity higher than that specied in the initial contract. They may also decide
not to trade with each other, in which case the principal trades with the external party. All
transactions occur at the end of period two. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
I next specify in detail the payo¤s from trade, the principals superior information on trade
valuations, the contracts that the principal and agent can write, and how they renegotiate
the initial contract.
Payoffs From Trade. The principal values trade with the agent (per unit) as vP , the
agent values trade with the principal (per unit) as vA, and the payo¤s of the principal and
agent are quasi-linear in money. Thus, if the principal and agent trade a quantity q they
obtain, in addition to any transfers involved in the transaction, qvP and qvA, respectively. For
future convenience, the total value of trade between the principal and the agent is denoted
v := vP + vA.5 The principal values trade with the external agent (per unit) as vE . To
5For example, consider a situation in which the principal is the buyer, the agent is the seller and the
buyer needs at most one unit of the good. In this case, vP corresponds to the utility the buyer derives from
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simplify notation, the value of trade to the external party when trading with the principal is
normalized to zero. Thus, vE also denotes the total value of trade between the principal and
the external party. This value of trade is assumed to be always non-negative.
(The Principals Superior) Information. In stage one (ex-ante), when the principal
and the agent negotiate the contract, vP , vA and vE are stochastic and their probability
distributions (may) depend on the state of world  2 fL; Hg. The state  is known to
the principal but not to the agent. The agent knows only that  = i with probability pi,
i = L;H. Throughout the c.d.f. of the trade valuation vj given state  is denoted by Fvj (: j )
for all j 2 fP;A;Eg and  2 fL; Hg. For convenience of exposition, the precise way in
which the state of the world a¤ects the probability distribution of the trade valuations will be
specied later. The asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent vanishes
at the beginning of stage two when both observe the realization of trade valuations vP , vA
and vE .
Contracts. At the beginning of period one, the principal o¤ers a contract to the agent.
The agent either accepts the o¤er or rejects it. The agents decision depends on the contracts
terms and on his beliefs about the state  following the observation of the contract o¤ered.
It is assumed that the agent accepts the o¤er whenever indi¤erent between accepting it and
rejecting it.6 If the agent accepts the o¤er, the principal and agent can then prepare for trade
in stage two. If the agent rejects the o¤er, the principal and agent obtain their reservation
payo¤s, which are, respectively, the expected value of dealing later with the external party
and zero. In the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1992), we could allow the (informed) principal
to o¤er the agent a menu of contracts (as opposed to a single contract). Doing so, however,
would not a¤ect the results obtained in the paper. Indeed, the set of equilibrium payo¤s
obtained is the same regardless of whether the principal can o¤er menus of contracts or just
single contracts. Moreover, the characterization of the equilibrium levels of commitment
(quantity and exclusivity level) obtained in the paper remain the same if the principal can
o¤er menus of contracts.
A contract can specify an up-front transfer t 2 R from the agent to the principal, a quantity
q 2 Q  [0; 1], and a level of exclusivity e 2 E  [0; 1]. A negative transfer t corresponds
to a transfer from the principal to the agent. Quantity and exclusivity are modeled as
probabilities. Quantity q denotes the probability that the principal and the agent must trade.
The exclusivity variable e denotes the probability that the agreement is exclusive, i.e., that
the principal cannot trade with the external party in stage two. Hence, a contract is an object
of the form c := (t; q; e) 2 C, where C = R  Q  E. The expected payo¤s of the principal
and the agent for any given contract c are derived in the next section. Observe that the
quantity and exclusivity variables can be interpreted as proportions of trade capacity. Under
consuming one unit of the good and vA =  c; where c denotes the cost of the seller from producing one unit
of this same good. The value created by the buyer and the seller is given by v = vP + vA = vP   c:
6This assumption rules out equilibria with partial acceptance of the contract o¤er, i.e. equilibria in which
the agent randomizes between accepting the o¤er and rejecting it.
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this interpretation, quantity q represents the proportion of the trade capacity of the principal
that is contractually allocated to the agent, and exclusivity e represents the proportion of the
remaining (1 q) of the trade capacity of the principal that cannot be traded with an external
party. Also, the assumption that e is a proportion is not crucial. As it will become clear
from the analysis, the results in the paper hold if contracts can only prescribe full exclusivity
(e = 1) or full non-exclusivity (e = 0).
Contract Renegotiation. Upon learning the valuations of trade at beginning of stage
two, the principal and the agent renegotiate trade to the e¢ cient level whenever the initial
contract prescribes an ine¢ cient level of trade. Renegotiation is modeled as in Che and
Hausch (1999) and Segal and Whinston (2000b, 2002), where each party obtains an exoge-
nously determined proportion of the gains from renegotiation. Specically, I assume that
the principal and agent receive, respectively, xed (bargaining) shares P and A, where
P + A = 1 and i 2 (0; 1), i = A;P , of the renegotiation surplus over the disagreement
point determined by the original contract.7 Despite renegotiation, the original contract still
matters because it a¤ects the distribution of ex-post surplus, which in turn is important for
surplus extraction by the principal. Finally, it is assumed that the external party with whom
the principal can alternatively trade in stage two receives no surplus. This is consistent, for
instance, with a case of competition amongst many external parties who are willing to deal
with the principal in case she does not trade with the agent.
The equilibrium concept used is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
I conclude the description of the model with two observations. First, the fact that A > 0
means that the agent has some bargaining power at the contract renegotiation stage. Since
at the initial contracting stage the principal makes a take it or leave it o¤er to the agent,
this means that the agent gains (at least) some bargaining power when a contract is signed
and a relationship with the principal is initiated. There are several reasons why this may
happen in reality. As mentioned in the Introduction, as part of preparing for the transaction,
the agent may obtain information about the principal that puts him in a better position
to negotiate with the principal. Parties may also make investments that may a¤ect their
bargaining positions. Or, the agents bargaining power may increase simply because an
eventual renegotiation of the initial contract occurs closer to the date of the transaction,
which may leave the principal more impatient to reach a deal.8
7It is possible to specify an underlying bargaining game that corresponds to a constant bargaining share.
Consider, for example, a generalized Nash bargaining game or a Rubinstein bargaining game with di¤erent
discount factors. Some articles have considered contracts incorporating schemes that ex-ante manipulate
partiesfuture bargaining power (e.g., Chung, 1991; and Aghion et al., 1994). Such schemes are not considered
here. Their implementation may be quite elaborate. Moreover, they may fail if parties always renegotiate
ine¢ cient outcomes as is the case here or face nancial constraints. For a more thorough discussion of this
issue, see Che and Hausch (1999).
8This will be particularly the case if completing the transaction on time is important for the principal. For
example, it might be important for a manufacturer to close a transaction with a supplier by a certain date so
that the manufacturer can honour commitments with clients.
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Second, while the model focuses on the contracting problem between a principal and a
given agent, it is consistent with the following situation. There are initially many agents
competing to trade in future (and therefore to sign a contract) with the principal; if the
principal initiates a relationship with one agent by agreeing on a contract with him, trade
between them generates vP + vA, while trade between the principal and each of the other
(standard) agents generates vE ; and if the principal fails to sign a contract initially with one
agent, then trade with any of the agents generates again vE . In this context, agreeing on a
contract with one agent creates the possibility of developing a transaction that may generate
more surplus than a standard spot market transaction.
3. Expected payoffs and probability of success of the relationship
We are interested in characterizing the contract agreed by the principal and the agent
at the beginning of stage one. The decisions of the principal and the agent regarding that
contract depend on their expected payo¤s given di¤erent contract choices. It is therefore
convenient to derive those payo¤s before proceeding to the analysis of equilibrium outcomes.
The expected payo¤s of the principal and agent at the beginning of stage one take into account
the uncertainty on the trade valuations as well as the outcome of an eventual renegotiation.
Thus, to derive them, one must rst characterize the partiespost-renegotiation payo¤s.
At the renegotiation stage, the principal and agent receive their bargaining shares of the
renegotiation surplus in addition to their disagreement payo¤s. The disagreement payo¤s
of the principal and agent are the payo¤s in the event they do not reach a renegotiation
agreement, in which case the initial contract is executed. Given a contract c and trade
valuations vA; vP and vE , the disagreement payo¤ of the agent is qvA   t and that of the
principal is qvP + (1   q)(1   e)vE + t. The renegotiation surplus is the di¤erence between
the e¢ cient total surplus, which is maxfv; vEg, and the sum of the disagreement payo¤s.
From the above, it follows that given a contract c and trade valuations ' := (vA; vP ; vE),
the agents post renegotiation payo¤ is given by
uA(c;') = (qvA   t) + A [maxfv; vEg   (qvA   t)  (qvP + (1  q)(1  e)vE + t)]
= Amaxfv; vEg+ (1  A)(qvA   t)  A[qvP + (1  q)(1  e)vE + t].(1)
Similarly, the principals post renegotiation payo¤ can be written as
(2) uP (c;') = P maxfv; vEg+ (1  P )[qvP + (1  q)(1  e)vE + t]  P (qvA   t).
Thus, the post renegotiation payo¤s of the principal and the agent depend positively on the
total e¢ cient surplus (the rst term in (1) and in (2)); positively on the own disagreement
payo¤ (the second term in (1) and in (2)); and negatively on the disagreement payo¤s of
the other party (the third term in (1) and in (2)). By a¤ecting partiesdisagreement payo¤s
at the renegotiation stage, the initial contract a¤ects the distribution of rents between the
principal and the agent.
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The ex-ante expected payo¤s of the principal and the agent if they agree on a contract
correspond to the expected value in stage one of their post-renegotiation payo¤s. Since the
principal knows  and the agent does not, the expected payo¤ of the principal depends on
state , while the expected payo¤ of the agent depends on his beliefs about . These beliefs
may or may not coincide with the agents initial beliefs. The agent may revise his beliefs
about  after observing the contract o¤ered by the principal. Thus, given contract c, when
the agent believes that  = H with probability bpH , his expected payo¤ is given by
UA(c; bpH) = (1  bpH)E[uA(c;') j L] + bpHE[uA(c;') j H ].
The principals expected payo¤ given contract c and state  is
UP (c; ) = E[uP (c;') j ].
With a slight abuse of notation, UA(c; 0) and UA(c; 1) will be frequently denoted by UA(c; L)
and UA(c; H), respectively. Using this notation, we can write UA(c; bpH) = (1 bpH)UA(c; L)+bpHUA(c; H).
Because the principal and the agent renegotiate the initial contract whenever it prescribes
an ine¢ cient level of trade, uA(c;') + uP (c;') = s('), for all c and ', where s(') :=
maxfv; vEg denotes the e¢ cient total surplus (hereinafter total surplus). Letting S() :=
E[s(') j ] denote the expected total surplus given state , this implies that for all c 2 C and
 2 fL; Hg,
(3) UA(c; ) + UP (c; ) = S().
This property of the expected payo¤s will be important in the analysis that follows.
A relationship between the principal and the agent is said to be successful if at the end of
stage two the principal and the agent trade with each other. Because renegotiation always
leads to an e¢ cient outcome, they do so if and only if v  vE . Hence, from an ex-ante perspec-
tive, the probability of success of their relationship is P () := Pr[v  vE j ]. Throughout, I
focus on the case in which P () is strictly positive for all  2 fL; Hg.
4. Ex-ante commitment and surplus extraction
We can now characterize the contract agreed by the principal and the agent in equilibrium
and, consequently, equilibrium ex-ante commitment by the principal to the relationship. Since
renegotiation implies that the ex-post trade decisions are always e¢ cient, the main goal of
the principal when designing the contract is to appropriate as much of the surplus generated
by their relationship as possible. A problem of rent appropriation by the principal emerges
here because the agents decision of whether or not to accept a given contract if o¤ered by
the principal may depend on the agents beliefs about the state . Thus, the contract o¤ered
by the principal (and more specically its design) is also important because it may convey
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information about  to the agent. In equilibrium, the principal and the agent always agree
on a contract.9 Therefore, in what follows, the focus is on the type of contracts they sign.
As a benchmark, consider the case where only the transfer t is contractible. In this case,
no commitment by the principal to the relationship is possible. Only pooling equilibria where
the principal proposes as initial contract the same transfer regardless of the state  exist. In
equilibrium the agent learns nothing about state  from the principals contract o¤er. This
implies that the highest transfer that the agent is willing to accept in equilibrium is such
that his expected payo¤UA(c; pH) is zero.10 In one of the states of the world the agent is left
with positive surplus, which the principal would like appropriate.
I next return to the case where the contract can specify a quantity and an exclusivity levels,
meaning that commitment by the principal to the relationship is possible. I rst analyze the
case where the principals private information is either about the trade valuation vP or about
the trade valuation vA (private internal information) and then the case where the principals
private information is about the externalvaluation vE (private external information).
4.1. Private internal information. Suppose the principals private information is either
about vP or about vA. Whether the principal has private information on vP or on vA is
relevant in terms of the analysis and results. Therefore, the two cases are analyzed separately.
They are dened in the following way: (1) Private information about vP : FvP (: j H) strictly
rst order stochastically dominates FvP (: j L), and the distribution of vA does not depend
on state , i.e., FvA(: j L) = FvA(: j H); (2) Private information about vA: FvA(: j H)
strictly rst order stochastically dominates FvA(: j L), and the distribution of vP does not
depend on state , i.e., FvP (: j L) = FvP (: j H).11 In both cases the distribution of vE is
independent of , i.e., FvE (: j L) = FvE (: j H).
Observe that in both cases the principal expects the relationship with the agent to create
more value in state H than in state L. In the case of private information about vP , this
is because the principal expects her value of trading with the agent to be higher in state H
than in state L. In the case of private information about vA, this is because the principal
expects the agents value of trading with her to be higher in state H than in state L. The
above specications imply that P (L)  P (H). That is, the probability of success of the
relationship between the principal and the agent is higher in state H than in state L.
I begin the analysis of private internal information with an observation that follows from
the fact that vE is independent of the state .
9Observe, for example, that a contract specifying a su¢ ciently low transfer, quantity, and exclusivity level
is always accepted by the agent and gives the principal a higher payo¤ than her outside option. This is
essentially because, regardless of state , initiating a relationship creates more joint value to the principal and
agent than taking their outside options.
10There is a continuum of equilibria. Any transfer t 2 [minfUA(c; L); UA(c; H)g; UA(c; pH)] can be pro-
posed by the principal (and accepted by the agent) in equilibrium.
11A distribution F (x) strictly rst order stochastically dominates a distribution G(x) if F (x) < G(x) for
all x such that G(x) 6= 0 and F (x) 6= 1.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that the principals private information is only about the internal
values of trade vP or vA, i.e. FvE (: j L) = FvE (: j H). Then, exclusivity has no e¤ect
on the set of equilibrium payo¤s: for any equilibrium when the contract space is C = R 
Q E, there exists a payo¤ equivalent equilibrium when the contract space is C 0 = RQ
f0g. Furthermore, exclusivity is fully indeterminate in equilibrium: contracts specifying any
exclusivity level e 2 [0; 1] can be chosen by the principal in equilibrium and in any state .
Thus, in the case of private internal information, not only the use of contracted exclusivity
is irrelevant in terms of equilibrium payo¤s but also the principals private information is
immaterial in explaining contracted exclusivity levels. To understand the proposition, note
that when vE does not depend on , the expected payo¤ of the principal can be written as
UP (c; ) = PS() + (1  P )fqE[vP j ] + (1  q)(1  e)E[vE ] + tg   P (qE[vA j ]  t).
In this expected payo¤ there is no interaction between the level of contracted exclusivity e and
the state . Thus, the impact of changing e on the principals expected payo¤ is independent
of the state . The same is true for transfer t. This implies that for any given contract c,
it is possible to simultaneously change the exclusivity level and the value of the transfer, in
this case increasing both or decreasing both, so as to obtain a new contract that confers the
principal the same expected payo¤ as contract c in both states L and H . More specically,
for any two contracts c = (t; q; e) and c0 = (t0; q; e0) in which t0 = t+(1 P )(1 q)(e0 e)E[vE ],
UP (c; ) = UP (c
0; ) for all  2 fL; Hg. Furthermore, since the sum of the expected payo¤s
of the principal and agent is always identical to the expected total surplus and the expected
total surplus does not depend on the contract initially agreed by the principal and the agent
(condition (3)), this also means that UA(c; ) = UA(c0; ) for all  2 fL; Hg. Thus, contracts
c and c0 are payo¤ equivalent to the principal and the agent regardless of the state . This
implies that if there is an equilibrium in which the principal chooses contract c (with positive
probability) in state L or in state H , then there exists another equilibrium identical in every
dimension to that one, except that contract c is replaced by contract c0 in the principals choice
of contract. This has two important implications. First, since exclusivity e0 in contract c0 can
be anything (provided t0 is adjusted properly), exclusivity is undetermined in equilibrium.
Second, because e0 can be zero, and equilibria in which contract c is replaced by contract c0
are payo¤ equivalent, the set of equilibrium payo¤s does not change if the principal and the
agent are restricted to write non-exclusive contracts, i.e., contracts that specify e = 0. Since
the proposition follows almost directly from this discussion, it is stated without further proof.
Another way of understanding Proposition 1 is to note that when information is only about
internal values of trade, there is no cross e¤ect between exclusivity and private information
 in the expected payo¤s of the principal and the agent. In other words, the expected
utilities of the principal and the agent do not satisfy the strict single crossing property with
respect to exclusivity. As a consequence, exclusivity cannot be used as a signalling device
by the principal. This is somewhat analogous to a result in Segal and Whinston (2000b).
They study the e¤ect of contracted exclusivity on the investment incentives of parties to a
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relationship, and show that exclusivity has no e¤ect on investments that a¤ect only internal
values. In Segal and Whinston (2000b), no cross e¤ect between exclusivity and investments
in the payo¤ functions implies no e¤ect of exclusivity on investments. In this paper, no
cross e¤ect between exclusivity and private information  in the payo¤ functions implies that
exclusivity has no e¤ect on surplus extraction through information signalling.
I next analyze the contracts that are chosen in equilibrium by the principal and the agent
as well as their expected payo¤s. The cases of private information about vP and private
information about vA are considered separately. Since exclusivity plays no role in neither
case, in what follows I focus on the role of commitments to trade (i.e., contracted quantity)
by restricting attention to non-exclusive contracts. Thus, in the remainder of this section, a
contract c is a transfer-quantity pair (t; q) and expected payo¤s are written as UA(t; q; bpH)
and UP (t; q; ).
4.1.1. Private information about vP . Consider rst the case where the principal is better
informed than the agent about her value of trade with the agent vP . Let qi denote the
contracted quantity chosen by the principal in state i; i = L;H. The following proposition
is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the principals private information is about vP . Then, there
exist both separating and pooling equilibria. In all the equilibria, the principal commits ex-
ante to trade a (weakly) higher quantity with the agent in state H than in state L. More
specically, there exists bq 2 (0; 1), the same across all equilibria, such that in every equilibrium
qL  bq  qH . Furthermore, all the equilibria are payo¤ equivalent. In all of them the
principal always appropriates all the surplus, i.e., the principals payo¤ in state  is S(), for
all  2 fL; Hg.
Two main reasons explain this proposition. First, it is less costly for the principal to
commit to trade a high quantity with the agent in state H than in state L. To see this,
recall that the contract initially agreed by the principal and the agent crucially a¤ects their
disagreement payo¤s during renegotiation and, therefore, the division of surplus. Since the
disagreement payo¤ of the principal is qvP + (1   q)vE + t, she is more willing to increase
the quantity in the contract when she expects vP to be high (i.e., in state H) than when
she expects vP to be low (i.e., in state L). This can also be seen by direct inspection of the
expected payo¤ of the principal. When the principals private information is about vP , her
expected payo¤ is given by
(4) UP (c; ) = PS() + (1  P )fqE[vP j ] + (1  q)E[vE ] + tg   P (qE[vA]  t).
Contracted quantity q and the state  only interact in the second term, which is precisely
the expected disagreement payo¤ of the principal. Since E[vP j H ]  E[vP j L], the e¤ect of
increasing contracted quantity on the expected payo¤ of the principal is greater in state H
than in state L. Because of this, contracts cL (chosen by the principal in state L) and cH
(chosen by the principal in state H) are incentive compatible for the principal, as required
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in any equilibrium, only if qL  qH ; and in separating equilibria the principal in state H is
able to signal to the agent a high expected value of trade by proposing a quantity strictly
greater than that she proposes in state is L.
Second, the agents preferences (ranking) over the two states of the world depend on the
quantity specied in the contract. To see this observe that the agents expected payo¤ given
state  and contract c can be written as
(5) UA(c; ) = AS() + (1  A)(qE[vA]  t)  AfqE[vP j ] + (1  q)E[vE ] + tg.
The state  a¤ects this payo¤ in two ways. It a¤ects the value of the total surplus, part of
which the agent appropriates through renegotiationthe rst term of UA(c; ). It also a¤ects
the disagreement payo¤ of the principal, which a¤ects (negatively) the agents gains from
renegotiationthe last term of UA(c; ). When contracted quantity is small (i.e., smaller thanbq) the second e¤ect is small and the agent prefers state H to state L, as total surplus is
larger in the former. In contrast, when contracted quantity is large (i.e., greater than bq), the
second e¤ect is large and dominant. The agent prefers state L to state H , as in the latter
the disagreement payo¤ of the principal is higher.
Because of these two reasons there exist contracts cL and cH , the rst specifying a small
quantity and the second a large quantity, that: (i) are incentive compatible for the principal
in the sense that she prefers contract cL to contract cH in state L and contract cH to contract
cL in state H ; (ii) allow the principal to appropriate all the surplus in states L and H ,
respectively; and (iii) and are accepted by the agent regardless of the agents beliefs.
In fact there exists a continuum of equilibria. Consider the sets of contracts CH = fc 2 C :
UP (c; H) = S(H) and q  bqg and CL = fc 2 C : UP (c; L) = S(L) and q  bqg. For any
pair of contracts (cL; cH) 2 CL  CH there exist an equilibrium in which cL is the contract
chosen in state L and cH is the contract chosen in H . These are all the equilibria. Thus,
there is a continuum of separating equilibria. In each, the principal commits to trade a higher
quantity with the agent in state the H than in state L (i.e., qL < qH) and the principals
contract o¤er fully reveals the true state  to the agent. In these equilibria, the principal
signals a high (low) expected valuation of trade vp to the agent by committing ex-ante to
trade a high (low) quantity with him. This is in sharp contrast with the benchmark case
discussed above where it is assumed that only transfers are contractible. In that case only
pooling equilibria exist and the principal is unable to appropriate the entire surplus in both
states of the world.12
4.1.2. Private information about vA. Consider now the case of private information about vA.
We can state the following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix.
12There is one contract that is in both CL and CH . It species quantity bq. As a consequence, there is one
pooling equilibrium in which the principal o¤ers the same contract to the agent regardless of the state . The
existence of this equilibrium is an artefact of considering a model with only two states, L and H . Quantitybq is the quantity for which the expected payo¤ of the agent in the two states intersect. In a model with more
states, such a pooling equilibrium does not necessarily exist.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that the principals private information is about vA. Then, there
exist both separating and pooling equilibria and multiple equilibrium payo¤s. In all these
equilibria, the principal commits ex-ante to trade a (weakly) lower quantity with the agent in
state H than in state L, i.e., qH  qL. Furthermore, contractibility of quantity expands the
set of equilibrium payo¤s of the principal in state L but not in state H .
In contrast with the case of private information about vP , in the case of private information
about vA it is more costly for the principal to commit to trade a high quantity with the agent
in state H than it is in state L. The reason is the following. Contracted quantity a¤ects the
disagreement payo¤ of the agent in the event of a renegotiation, which is given by qvA   t.
Since any improvement in the agents disagreement payo¤ reduces the principals ability to
appropriate surplus during the renegotiation of the initial contract, the principal gains less
by increasing contracted quantity when she expects a high vA (i.e. in state H) than when
she expects a low vA (i.e., in state L). (As in the previous case, this could also be seen by
direct inspection of the expected payo¤ of the principal.) Because of this, in any equilibrium
qH  qL, and in separating equilibria the principal in state H signals to the agent that
his valuation of trade is likely to be high by proposing a quantity strictly smaller than that
she proposes in state is L. In contrast with the case of private information about vP , the
principal commits ex-ante less to the relationship when its probability of success is higher.
Another important di¤erence relative to the case of private information about vP is that the
principal is unable to extract all the surplus in both states of the world. In any equilibrium,
the agent appropriates some of the surplus generated in state H (i.e., when his value of
trade is expected to be high). This is because the agent always prefers state H to state
L regardless of the contract agreed with the principal. Observe that in the case of private
information about vA,
UA(c; ) = AS() + (1  A)(qE[vA j ]  t)  AfqE[vP ] + (1  q)E[vE ] + tg,
and since E[vA j H ]  E[vA j L], the agents expected payo¤ satises UA(c; H)  UA(c; L)
for all c 2 C. This implies that the payo¤ of the principal in state L must be at least
S(L), as the agent accepts any contract c o¤ered by the principal such that UA(c; L) = 0
regardless of his beliefs about . However, in state H , some surplus is left to the agent,
even if the principal o¤ers the agent a contract specifying a quantity of zero, the contracted
quantity that more e¢ ciently signals to the agent that the state is H . While there exist
multiple equilibria, they are not payo¤ equivalent. Indeed, the highest equilibrium payo¤
of the principal in state H is obtained when the principal proposes a contract specifying a
quantity of zero and is the same as when quantity is not contractible.
4.2. Private External Information. Suppose now the principals private information when
contracting with the agent is about the principals value of trading in the future with the
external party vE . Specically, suppose that: (i) the distribution FvE (: j L) strictly rst
order stochastically dominates the distribution FvE (: j H), and (ii) the distributions of in-
ternal values vA and vP do not depend on , i.e., Fvj (: j L) = Fvj (: j H) for j = A;P .
SIGNALLING THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 17
Under these assumptions, the principal is more likely to have a good external party to trade
with in state L than in state H . This means that, in conformity with the cases of private
information about vP and private information about vA studied above, state H is associated
with a higher probability of success of the relationship than state L, i.e., also in this case
P (L)  P (H).
Since exclusivity may play a role in the case of private information about the external
value of trade vE , I reconsider it in the analysis. Hence, a contract is a triple c = (t; q; e) 2 C.
In what follows, let (qi; ei) denote the contracted quantity-exclusivity pair chosen by the
principal in state i, i = L;H. The main results of this section are presented in the following
proposition, which is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the principals private information is about vE. Then, there
exist both separating and pooling equilibria. In all the equilibria, the principal commits ex-ante
(weakly) more to the relationship (either through a higher contracted quantity and/or through
a higher level of exclusivity) in state H than in state L. More specically, there existsbx 2 (0; 1), the same across all the equilibria, such that (1 qH)(1 eH)  bx  (1 qL)(1 eL).
Furthermore, all the equilibria are payo¤ equivalent. In all of them the principal always
appropriates all the surplus, i.e., the principals payo¤ in state  is S(), for all  2 fL; Hg.
The arguments behind this proposition resemble those underlying Proposition 2 regard-
ing the case of private information on vP . As in that case, two main reasons explain this
proposition. First, a commitment to trade a high quantity or to deal exclusively (or almost
exclusively) with the agent is less costly for the principal in state H (when she expects a
low value of trade with the external party) than in state L (when she expects a high value
of trade with the external party). The reason for this is simple. When both quantity and ex-
clusivity are contractible, the disagreement payo¤ of the principal, which a¤ects her position
during renegotiation and ability to appropriate surplus, is given by qvP +(1 q)(1 e)vE+ t.
Thus, the higher are her expectations about vE , the more she has to lose by o¤ering a con-
tract with a high quantity and/or exclusivity level. In other words, by agreeing in the initial
contract to a high level of exclusivity or a high quantity, the principal reduces the possibility
of trading later with the external party if the initial contract is enforced. From an ex-ante
point of view, forgoing that possibility is more costly for the principal in state L (when she
expects a high vE) than it is in state H (when she expects a low vE).
Second, the quantity and exclusivity level specied in the contract proposed by the prin-
cipal a¤ect the agents preferences (ranking) over the two states of the world. Follow-
ing a reasoning similar to that used in the case of private information on vp, we obtain
that for contracts that specify a high quantity or a high exclusivity level (i.e., such that
(1  qH)(1  eH)  bx) then UA(c; L)  UA(c; H); and for contracts that specify a low quan-
tity and a low exclusivity level (i.e., such that bx  (1 qL)(1 eL)), the opposite happens and
UA(c; L)  UA(c; H). Because of these two reasons, the principal always commits (weakly)
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more to the relationship in state H than in state L, she signals a low outside option in sepa-
rating equilibria by committing strictly more (through a higher exclusivity level or quantity)
to the relationship, and she always appropriates the entire surplus.
As in the case of private information about vP , there exists a continuum of equilibria.
Consider the following sets of contracts CH = fc 2 C : UP (c; H) = S(H) and (1 q)(1 e) bxg and CL = fc 2 C : UP (c; L) = S(L) and bx  (1  q)(1  e)g. For any pair of contracts
(cL; cH) 2 CL  CH there exists an equilibrium in which the principal o¤ers contract cL in
state L and contract cH in state H . Thus, there is a continuum of separating equilibria
where the principals contract o¤er fully reveals the true state  to the agent. In these
equilibria, the principal signals to the agent a low value of her outside option by committing
ex-ante more to the relationship. As mentioned above, the principal does so by initially
committing to trade more exclusively or a higher quantity (or both) with the agent.13
Proposition 4 and the discussion above also apply if only quantity or only exclusivity is
contractible. The characterization of the equilibria in the former case is given by setting e = 0
in the proposition and analysis, and in the latter case by setting q = 0. Thus, if quantity is
contractible but exclusivity is not, the principal can still use quantity to signal information
and appropriate surplus. Similarly, when quantity is not contractible (because for example it
is not veriable), the principal can use exclusivity to signal information so as to appropriate
more surplus.
One way of interpreting Propositions 2-4 is that an observed higher ex-ante commitment
to a relationship by two parties does not necessarily mean a higher probability of success of
the relationship. As seen above, the principal commits more to the relationship when the
probability of success of the relationship is higher if her private information is about her
valuation of trade with the agent or about her valuation of trade with the external party.
This is not the case, however, if the principals private information is about the agents value
of trading with the principal. In fact, in this case the opposite happens.
5. Discussion
The analysis above considers separately the cases of private information about vP , private
information about vA and private information about vE . A separate analysis of each case
has the virtue of emphasizing how the level and form of commitment to the relationship
by the informed principal is a¤ected by the source of her private information. In reality,
however, a party to a relationship may simultaneously have private information on more
than one valuation of trade. I next briey discuss how the analysis can be extended to
accommodate such cases and how (qualitatively) the results obtained in the previous section
change. Among other things, I argue that even when the state  a¤ects multiple valuations of
trade, the principals incentive to commit to a higher (or lower) level of exclusivity depends
13There exist contracts that are in both CL and CH . They satisfy (1   q)(1   e) = bx. These are the
contracts o¤ered by the principal in pooling equilibria. Once again, the existence of this pooling equilibria is
an artefact of considering a model with only two states, L and H .
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only on how the state  a¤ects vE ; and, as before, the principal is more willing to commit
to a higher level of exclusivity when she expects a low value of vE . Regarding the principals
incentives to choose a higher contracted quantity, they depend on how the state  e¤ects
all valuations vA, vP and vE . Specically, they increase when vP is expected to be higher
relative to vA and vE .
It is useful to begin with the case where the principals private information is only about
the internal valuations vP and vA. Accordingly, suppose the probability distributions of vP
and vA depend both on the state , but the distribution of vE does not. As before, only
the principal observes . The agent knows only that  = i with probability pi. To simplify
notation, let vj := E[vj j H ]   E[vj j L] for j = P;A and S := S(H)   S(L). Assume
thatS > 0. Thus, as before, in the case of private internal information state H is associated
with a higher total surplus than state L. As a rst observation, note that Proposition 1
also applies when the principal has private information on both vP and vA. Therefore the
contracted level of exclusivity cannot be used to signal such information and any exclusivity
level may emerge in equilibrium. Regarding contracted quantity, whether in equilibrium it is
greater in state H than in state L or vice versa critically depends on the relative impact of
the state  on the valuations vP and vA. Specically, following an analysis similar to that in
Section 4.1, we obtain that the principal commits ex-ante to trade a higher quantity in state
H than in state L, i.e. that qH  qL if
(6) (1  P )vP   PvA > 0;
and that qL  qH otherwise. The intuition is similar to that when private information is
only about vP or only about vA. The key di¤erence is that in this case the state  a¤ects
simultaneously the disagreement payo¤s of the principal and the agent i.e., the payo¤s if
the initial contract is enforced. When condition (6) is satised, accounting for these two
e¤ects, the relative change in valuations and disagreement payo¤s is such the principal gains
more from increasing contracted quantity in state H than in state L. In other words, it is
less costly for the principal to commit to trade a higher quantity in state H than in state
L. This occurs when vP is su¢ ciently large relative to vA . In contrast, when vA is
su¢ ciently large relative to vP , it is costlier for the principal to commit ex-ante to trade a
higher quantity is state H than in state L, and the principal commits to a lower quantity in
state H than in state L. The cases of private information on vP and of private information
on vA studied in Section 4.1 are examples of each situation. In the former case, vP > 0 and
vA = 0; in the latter, vP = 0 andvA > 0. Regarding surplus extraction, the principal will
appropriate the entire surplus in both states if and only if (1 P )vP PvA > (1 P )S .
In such cases, the e¤ect of the state  on disagreement payo¤s is large relative to its e¤ect
on total surplus that the agents ranking of the states depends on the contract. As in the
case of private information on vP (which satises the above condition), there exist contracts
cL (specifying a low quantity) and cH (specifying a high quantity) that are accepted by
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the agent, are incentive compatible for the principal and allow her to appropriate the entire
surplus in both states.
Consider now the case where the principal has private information on both internal and
external valuations of trade. In our setting such situation could be captured by assuming
that not only the distributions of vP and vA depend on the state  but also that of vE . In
what follows, let vE := E[vE j H ]   E[vE j L]. In this case both contracted quantity and
contracted exclusivity can be used by the principal to signal information. While feasible,
a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes is di¢ cult to obtain. This is because
equilibrium contracts depend on the relative e¤ect (sign and magnitude) of the state  on the
di¤erent valuations, and many di¤erent subcases would need to be considered. (Of course,
the cases considered in the previous section, can be seen as examples of such subcases.) As
such, it is perhaps more instructive to briey discuss how the state  a¤ects the principals
motivations for choosing di¤erent quantity or exclusivity levels in a contract. This is done
by looking at the requirement for two contracts cL and cH to be incentive compatible for the
principal.14
Consider rst the case of exclusivity. Fix quantity across the two contracts, i.e. set
qL = qH = q < 1, and let exclusivity vary. Incentive compatibility implies that
(1  p)(1  q)vE (eH   eL)  0.
We can make two observations. First, only the e¤ect of  on the external valuation is relevant.
This is because a change in the exclusivity level a¤ects the principals payo¤ only through
its e¤ect on the possibility of trading with the external party. Second, for contracts with the
same quantity, incentive compatibility requires a higher exclusivity level when the value of
the outside option is lower. The usual intuition applies here: it is costlier for a principal to
commit to trade exclusively with the agent when the principal expects to have a good outside
option in the future than when she expects a low outside option. In equilibrium, contracts
cL (chosen by the principal in state L) and cH (chosen by the principal in state H) must be
incentive compatible for the principal. Hence, for example in environments where quantity
is not contractible (because it is not veriable), this means that the principal will commit
ex-ante to a higher exclusivity level when she expect a low outside option.
Consider now the case of quantity. Following the same procedure, x the exclusivity
level across the two contracts, i.e. set eL = eH = e < 1, and let quantity vary. Incentive
compatibility implies that
(qH   qL) [(1  p)(vP   (1  e)vE )  pvA ]  0.
The e¤ect of  on all the trade valuations is now relevant. This is because a change in
contracted quantity a¤ects the disagreement payo¤ of the principal (which depends on vP
and vE) and the disagreement payo¤ of the agent (which depends on vA), both of which a¤ect
14As before, this simply means that contracts cL and cH must satisfy UP (cL; L)  UP (cH ; L) and
UP (cH ; H)  UP (cL; H). That is, the principal of type L prefers contract cL to contract cH , and the
principal of type H prefers contract cH to contract cL.
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the principals expected payo¤. When the term inside the square brackets is positive, the
gains for the principal from increasing quantity are greater in state H than in state L and
incentive compatibility requires qH  qL. If exclusivity clauses in contracts are not feasible
(for example because they are not allowed by courts) and only quantity is contractible, this
means that the principal will commit to trade a higher quantity in state H whenever vP
is large relative to vA and vE .
In this discussion of the case where the principal has private information on both internal
and external valuations of trade, we have kept one contractual variable xed and analyzed
changes in the other. When both quantity and exclusivity are contractible, it is of course the
combination of both that matters. When considering any two contracts, the principal and
agent will take into account the combined e¤ect of the changes in quantity and exclusivity
on their payo¤s, which depends on how the state a¤ects all valuations of trade.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a theory of ex-ante commitment to relationships. The theory is based
on a key element: the existence of asymmetry of information between parties when contracting
about the terms of a future relationship. Another important element of the theory is the
renegotiation of initially contracted terms when they turn out to be ine¢ cient ex-post. In
this context, I show how the level of contractual commitment to a relationship can be used
by a better informed party to signal information about the value of the relationship.
While the theory o¤ers clear predictions regarding which forms of commitment can be
used to signal information and when parties will commit more (or less) to a relationship,
the analysis shows that there are multiple equilibria (which is a typical feature of signalling
games). In the cases of private information about vP and private information about vE ,
di¤erent levels of contracted quantity and exclusivity may emerge in equilibrium, but all
equilibria are payo¤ equivalent. In all of them the informed party appropriates the entire
surplus despite the asymmetry of information. In the case of private information on vA, both
contracts and payo¤s may di¤er across di¤erent equilibria.
The application of standard equilibrium renements, such as the Intuitive Criterion and
Universal Divinity, has no impact on the results in the cases of private information about
vp and private information about vE . In other words, all the equilibria identied in Section
4 for these cases survive the two renements. The case of private information about vA is
di¤erent. While the result regarding contracted quantity continues to hold (i.e., qH  qL
in equilibrium), the result regarding equilibrium payo¤s changes. Specically, equilibria in
which the principals payo¤ exceeds the maximum equilibrium payo¤ that she can obtain
when only transfers are contractible survive neither the Intuitive Criterion nor Universal
Divinity. Thus, under these renements, the set of equilibrium payo¤s of the principal when
quantity is contractible is identical to that when it is not. Hence, if we focus on equilibria
that satisfy these renements, there is an even greater di¤erence between outcomes across
the di¤erent sources of private information. While commitments to trade a certain quantity
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and/or exclusively with the agent help the principal appropriate surplus when her private
information is about vP or about vE , they do not when her private information is about vA.
The paper considers contracted quantity and contracted exclusivity as two forms of contrac-
tual commitment to a relationship. The way in which quantity and exclusivity are modelled
enables broader interpretations. For example, contracted quantity may be interpreted as
contract duration. Thus, this paper provides an information based theory of contract dura-
tion. For example, the results in the paper suggest that in trade relationships, parties with
higher expected valuations from trade and with private information about those valuations
will propose and agree on trade contracts with a longer duration. Similarly for parties that
expect their value of trade with external parties or the value of trade to their partner in the
relationship to be low. Aghion and Bolton (1987) also touch the issue of contract duration
in a setting with asymmetric information. However, they do not consider the possibility of
ex-post renegotiation.
Exclusivity, in turn, may be interpreted in terms of asset ownership. In this paper the e¤ect
of exclusivity in a relationship is that it constrains a party to dealing with other (external)
parties. According to the property rights literature (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990), this is essentially the e¤ect of forgoing ownership of an asset that is essential
to trade with others. Thus, the results in the paper that characterize equilibrium exclusivity
can also be interpreted as results that endogenize asset ownership. Specically, they suggest
that a party in a relationship may give up ownership of an asset that is essential to trade
with others, to signal low outside options in the future.
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Appendix
This appendix is organized as follows. I start by stating and proving two new lemmas,
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which are used in the proofs of the propositions in the text. I then
prove the propositions in the text, with the exception of Proposition 1 which, as mentioned
in the text, is stated without further proof.
Lemma 1. Consider the case where the principals private information is about vP and let a
contract be c = (t; q). There exists bq 2 (0; 1) such that for all t 2 R, UA(t; q; H)  UA(t; q; L)
if and only if q  bq.
Proof. Taking expectation of (1) and rearranging terms, we obtain that when the principals
private information is about vP ,
UA(t; q; ) = (1  A)(qE[vA]  t) + AfS()  qE[vP j ]  (1  q)E[vE ]  tg.
Thus, UA(t; q; H)  UA(t; q; L) is equivalent to S(H) S(L)  q(E[vP j H ] E[vP j L]).
Since by assumption FvP (: j H) strictly rst order stochastically dominates FvP (: j L),
E[vP j H ] > E[vP j L]. Thus, UA(t; q; H)  UA(t; q; L) if and only if
q  bq := S(H)  S(L)
E[vP j H ]  E[vP j L] .
It remains to show that 0 < bq < 1. Since (i) S() = E[maxfvP + vA; vEg j ], (ii) maxfvP +
vA; vEg is an increasing function of vP and (iii) FvP (: j H) strictly rst-order stochastically
dominates FvP (: j L), then S(H) > S(L). Hence, bq > 0. Furthermore, from the fact that
(i) S() E[vP j ] = E[maxfvP +vA; vEg vP j ], (ii) maxfvP +vA; vEg vP is a decreasing
function of vP and (iii) FvP (: j H) strictly rst order stochastically dominates FvP (: j L),
it follows that S(H)  E[vP j H ] < S(L)  E[vP j L], which is equivalent to bq < 1.
Lemma 2. Consider the case where the principals private information is about vE and let
a contract be c = (t; q; e). There exists bx 2 (0; 1) such that for all t 2 R, UA(t; q; e; H) 
UA(t; q; e; L) if and only if (1  q)(1  e)  bx.
Proof. Taking expectation of (1) and rearranging terms we obtain that when the principals
private information is about vE ,
UA(t; q; e; ) = (1  A)(qE[vA]  t) + AfS()  qE[vP ]  (1  q)(1  e)E[vE j ]  tg.
It is then straightforward to obtain that UA(t; q; e; H)  UA(t; q; e; L) is equivalent to
S(L)   S(H)  (1   q)(1   e)(E[vE j L]   E[vE j H ]). Since by assumption FvE (: j L)
strictly rst order stochastically dominates FvE (: j H), E[vE j L] > E[vE j H ]. Thus,
UA(t; q; e; H)  UA(t; q; e; L) if and only if
(1  q)(1  e)  bx := S(L)  S(H)
E[vE j L]  E[vE j H ] .
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It remains to show that 0 < bx < 1. Since (i) S() = E[maxfvP + vA; vEg j ], (ii) maxfvP +
vA; vEg is an increasing function of vE and (iii) FvE (: j L) strictly rst order stochastically
dominates FvE (: j H), then S(L) > S(H). Hence, bx > 0. Furthermore, since (i) S()  
E[vE j ] = E[maxfvP +vA; vEg vE j ], (ii) maxfvP +vA; vEg vE is a decreasing function
of vE and (iii) FvE (: j L) strictly rst order stochastically dominates FvE (: j H), then
S(L)  E[vE j L] < S(H)  E[vE j H ], which is equivalent to bx < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is given in three steps. In the rst step I prove the result
on the principals payo¤s, in the second step I prove the result on the contracted quanities,
and in the last step I prove the existence of equilibrium.
Step 1: In any equilibrium the principals payo¤ in state  is S() for all
 2 fL; Hg. Let bq 2 (0; 1) be the threshold quantity such that for all t 2 R, UA(t; q; H) 
UA(t; q; L) if and only if q  bq. By Lemma 1 (in this Appendix) we know that bq exists. Con-
sider contracts cL = (tL; qL) and cH = (tH ; qH) such that: qL  bq  qH , tL = UA(0; qL; L),
and tH = UA(0; qH ; H). Thus, UA(cj ; j) = 0 for j = L;H and
(7) UA(cL; H)  UA(cL; L) = 0
and
(8) UA(cH ; L)  UA(cH ; H) = 0.
Conditions (7) and (8) imply, respectively, that UA(cL; bpH)  0 and UA(cH ; bpH)  0 for allbpH 2 [0; 1]. Hence, regardless of the agents beliefs bpH , he accepts contract cL as well as
contract cH if they are o¤ered by the principal. Since cL and cH satisfy UA(cj ; j) = 0 for
j = L;H, it follows by (3) that UP (cj ; j) = S(j) for j = L;H. Thus, in any equilibrium,
the principals payo¤ in both states must be at least the expected total surplus. Clearly, the
principals payo¤ in equilibrium cannot exceed S(j) in any state j , as by (3) that would
imply a negative expected payo¤ to the agent, in which case the agent would be better o¤
rejecting the contracts o¤ered by the principal.
Step 2: In any equilibrium qL  bq  qH . Consider an arbitrary equilibrium and let
cL = (tL; qL) and cH = (tH ; qH) denote contracts chosen with positive probability by the
principal in states L and H , respectively. Contracts cL and cH must satisfy
(9) UP (cH ; H)  UP (cL; H)
and
(10) UP (cL; L)  UP (cH ; L),
otherwise either in state H or in state L the principal would be better o¤ deviating by
mimicking the principal in the other state. Furthermore, by Step 1, contracts cL and cH
must satisfy UP (cj ; j) = S(j) for j = L;H. This implies by (3) that UA(cj ; j) = 0, which
means that tL = UA(0; qL; L) and tH = UA(0; qH ; H). From this and (3) again, it fol-
lows that we can write UP (cH ; H) = S(H) = UP (0; qL; H) + UA(0; qL; H), UP (cL; H) =
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UP (0; qL; H) + UA(0; qL; L), UP (cL; L) = S(L) = UP (0; qH ; L) + UA(0; qH ; L), and
UP (cH ; L) = UP (0; qH ; L) + UA(0; qH ; H). Using this, we obtain that (9) is equivalent
to UA(0; qL; H)  UA(0; qL; L) and (10) is equivalent to UA(0; qH ; L)  UA(0; qH ; H),
which by Lemma 1 implies that qL  bq and qH  bq, respectively.
Step 3: Existence of equilibrium. Consider any contracts cL = (tL; qL) and cH =
(tH ; qH) such that: qL  bq  qH , tL = UA(0; qL; L), and tH = UA(0; qH ; H). To show that
in state j the principal o¤ering contract cj to the agent, j = L;H, and the agent accepting
the o¤er constitute an equilibrium, it su¢ ces to show that there are o¤-the-equilibrium path
beliefs such that in no state the principal gains by deviating and o¤ering another contract
c0 to the agent. Observe that only deviations to a contract c0 such that UP (c0; ) > S() for
some  2 fL; Hg are protable to the principal. Suppose that UP (c0; H) > S(H). In this
case, let o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs of the agent after observing that the principal chose
c0 be bpH = 1. If instead UP (c0; L) > S(L) then let bpH = 0. With these beliefs the agents
expected payo¤ from accepting c0 is negative and the agent is better o¤ rejecting it.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is given in the following steps.
Step 1: In any equilibrium qH  qL. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium where cL =
(tL; qL) and cH = (tH ; qH) are contracts chosen with positive probability by the principal
in states L and H , respectively. Contracts cL and cH must be incentive compatible for
the principal, i.e., they must satisfy UP (cL; L)  UP (cH ; L) and UP (cH ; H)  UP (cL; H).
When the principals private information is about vA, these conditions are equivalent to
(11) tH   tL  (qH   qL) fPE[vA j L]  (1  P )(E[vP ]  E[vE ])g
and
(12) tH   tL  (qH   qL) fPE[vA j H ]  (1  P )(E[vP ]  E[vE ])g ,
respectively. Conditions (11) and (12) hold simultaneously only if the right-hand side of (11)
is greater than or equal to the right-hand side of (12). Since E[vA j H ] > E[vA j L], this is
possible only if qH  qL. I next analyze equilibrium payo¤s.
Step 2: Characterization of the principals equilibrium payo¤s. I begin by deriving
lower bounds for the principals equilibrium payo¤s. When private information is about vA,
(13) UA(c; ) = AS() + (1  A)(qE[vA j ]  t)  A fqE[vP ] + (1  q)E[vE ] + tg .
Since S(H) > S(L) and E[vA j H ] > E[vA j L], then UA(c; H) > UA(c; L) for all c 2 C.
This implies that the agent accepts any contract c such that UA(c; L)  0 regardless of his
beliefs about . Hence, by (3), a lower bound for the payo¤ of the principal in state L is
S(L). A lower bound for the payo¤ of the principal in state H can be obtained by solving
maxc UP (c; H) subject to UA(c; L)  0. As UP and UA are quasi-linear in t, in any solution
to this problem the constraint must hold with equality, and we can use it to eliminate t from
the problem. Next, observe that from (3) it follows that @UP (c; H)=@q =  @UA(c; H)=@q.
Finally, since @UA(c; H)=@q > @UA(c; H)=@q, the solution to the problem involves q = 0, t =
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UA(0; 0; L), and payo¤ to the principal UP (0; 0; H)+UA(0; 0; L). To simply the exposition,
let bUP (L) := S(L) and bUP (H) := UP (0; 0; H)+UA(0; 0; L). That is, bUP (L) and bUP (H)
denote the lower bounds for the principals payo¤s derived here. I next analyze the principals
equilibrium payo¤s. It is useful to consider separating and pooling equilibria separately.
Step 2.1 Principals payo¤s in separating equilibria. In any separating equilibrium
the payo¤ of the principal in state j is bUP (j) for j = L;H. To see this, consider a
separating equilibrium and let cj denote the contract o¤ered by the principal in state j . The
agents beliefs upon observing that contract cL is o¤ered are that  = L with probability
one. Since the agent accepts the o¤er, then UA(cL; L)  0, which by (3) implies that
UP (cL; L)  S(L) = bUP (L). Thus, UP (cL; L) = S(L) = bUP (L). To obtain that
UP (cH ; H)  bUP (H), observe that contracts cL and cH must be incentive compatible for
the principal. Hence, UP (cL; L)  UP (cH ; L). Since UP (cL; L) = S(L), it follows by (3)
that UA(cH ; L)  0. Because bUP (H) is the maxc UP (c; H) subject to UA(c; L)  0, then
UP (cH ; H)  bUP (H). Hence, UP (cH ; H) = bUP (H).
There exist a continuum of separating equilibria but they are all payo¤ equivalent. Specif-
ically, for every q 2 (0; 1], there exists a separating equilibrium in which cH = (0; tH),
cL = (q; tL), where tH = UA(0; 0; L) and tL = UA(0; q; L). They are supported by the o¤-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs where for all c 6= cL and c 6= cH , the agent believes that  = L
with probability one.
Step 2.2 Principals payo¤s in pooling equilibria. There exists an equilibrium in
which the principal o¤ers in both states the contract c = (t; q = 0) where t = UA(0; 0; L), i.e.
t is such that UA(c; L) = 0 . This equilibrium is sustained by the o¤-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs that if the principal o¤ers any contract c0 6= c, then the agent believes that that  = L
with probability one. In this equilibrium, the payo¤ of the principal of type j is bUP (j) for
j = L;H. These are the lowest equilibrium payo¤s of the principal in a pooling equilibrium.





s.t. (i) pLUA(c; L) + pHUA(c; H)  0
(ii) UP (c; i)  bUP (i) for i = L;H.
Observe that constraints (i) and (ii) characterize the set of pooling equilibria. For each
contract c that satises them, there exists a pooling equilibrium where the principal o¤ers
it and the agent accepts the o¤er. Once again, all these equilibria all supported by the o¤-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs where, if the principal o¤ers any contract c0 6= c, then the agent
believes that that  = L with probability one.
To solve problem (14) rst observe that in any solution, constraint (i) must bind. Thus, I
next analyze how the objective function evolves along constraint (i). Replacing the transfer
t in the objective function by its value when constraint (i) holds with equality, we obtain
mj(q) := UP (0; q; j) + pLUA(0; q; L) + pHUA(0; q; H).
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From (3), it follows that @UA(c; )=@q =  @UP (c; )=@q. Thus,
(15) @mj(q)=@q = @UP (0; q; j)=@q   [pL  @UP (0; q; L)=@q + pH  @UP (0; q; H)=@q] .
Because
@UP (0; q; )=@q = (1  P )(E[vP ]  E[vE ])  PE[vA j H ]
and E[vA j H ] > E[vA j L], we obtain that @UP (0; q; H)=@q < @UP (0; q; L)=@q. Thus,
from direct inspection of (15), it follows that @mH(q)=@q < 0 < @mL(q)=@q.
Consider rst the case of state H . Since @mH(q)=@q < 0, a contract that solves problem




H is such that constraint (i) binds.
Since cH also satises constraints (ii) it is a solution to problem (14) when j = H. Thus
the highest equilibrium payo¤ of the principal in a pooling equilibrium when the state is H
is UP (cH ; H) = UP (0; 0; H) + t

H , where t

H = pLUA(0; 0; L) + pHUA(0; 0; H). This is the
same as that when only transfers are contractible. Consider now the case of state L. Since,
@mL(q)=@q > 0, the objective function increases with q along constraint (i). Moreover,
constraints (ii) are slack when q = 0. Thus, denoting the solution by cL, we obtain that
UP (c

L; L) > UP (0; L)+pLUA(0; 0; L)+pHUA(0; 0; H), which is the maximum equilibrium
payo¤ of the principal when only transfers are contractible. These results together with those
obtained in Step 2.1 imply that the ability to contract on quantity expands the set of the
principals equilibrium payo¤s in state L but not in state H .
Finally, observe that to characterize the set of equilibrium payo¤s there is no need to
analyze semi-separating equilibria. This is because for any of such equilibria there is a payo¤
equivalent pooling equilibrium. Indeed, in any given semi-separating equilibrium at most one
contract can be o¤ered (with some probability) by both types of principal, as the principals
indi¤erence curves satisfy the single crossing property. Using (3) it is easy to obtain that
there is a payo¤ equivalent pooling equilibrium where the principal o¤ers that contract in
both states (with probability one).
Proof of Proposition 4. This proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and follows the same
steps.
Step 1: In any equilibrium the principals payo¤ in state  is S() for all  2
fL; Hg. Let bx 2 (0; 1) be the threshold value such that for all t 2 R, UA(t; q; e; H) 
UA(t; q; e; L) if and only if (1   q)(1   e)  bx. By Lemma 2 (in this Appendix) we know
that bx exists. Consider contracts cL = (tL; qL; eL) and cH = (tH ; qH ; eH) such that: (1  
qH)(1  eH)  bx  (1  qL)(1  eL), tL = UA(0; qL; eL; L), and tH = UA(0; qH ; eH ; H). By
construction UA(cj ; j) = 0 for j = L;H and
(16) UA(cL; H)  UA(cL; L) = 0
and
(17) UA(cH ; L)  UA(cH ; H) = 0.
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Conditions (16) and (17) imply, respectively, that UA(cL; bpH)  0 and that UA(cH ; bpH)  0
for all bpH 2 [0; 1]. Hence, regardless of the agents beliefs bpH , he accepts contract cL as well
as contract cH if any of these contracts is o¤ered by the principal. Since cL and cH satisfy
UA(cj ; j) = 0 for j = L;H, it follows by (3) that UP (cj ; j) = S(j) for j = L;H. Thus,
in any equilibrium, the principals payo¤ must be at least the expected total surplus in both
states. Clearly, the principals payo¤ in equilibrium cannot exceed S(j) in any state j , as
by (3) that would imply a negative expected payo¤ to the agent, in which case the agent
would prefer to reject the contract o¤ered by principal.
Step 2: In any equilibrium (1   qH)(1   eH)  bx  (1   qL)(1   eL). Consider an
arbitrary equilibrium and let cL = (tL; qL; eL) and cH = (tH ; qH ; eH) denote contracts chosen
with positive probability by the principal in states L and H , respectively. Contracts cL and
cH must satisfy
(18) UP (cH ; H)  UP (cL; H)
and
(19) UP (cL; L)  UP (cH ; L),
otherwise either in state H or in state L the principal would be better o¤ deviating by
mimicking the principal in the other state. Furthermore, by Step 1, contracts cL and cH
must satisfy UP (cj ; j) = S(j) for j = L;H. This implies by (3) that UA(cj ; j) = 0, which
means that tL = UA(0; qL; eL; L) and tH = UA(0; qH ; eH ; H). From this and (3) again,
it follows that we can write UP (cH ; H) = S(H) = UP (0; qL; eL; H) + UA(0; qL; eL; H),
UP (cL; H) = UP (0; qL; eL; H)+UA(0; qL; eL; L), UP (cL; L) = S(L) = UP (0; qH ; eH ; L)+
UA(0; qH ; eH ; L), and UP (cH ; L) = UP (0; qH ; eH ; L) + UA(0; qH ; eH ; H). Using this, we
obtain that (18) is equivalent to UA(0; qL; eL; H)  UA(0; qL; eL; L) and (10) is equivalent
to UA(0; qH ; eH ; L)  UA(0; qH ; eH ; H), which by Lemma 2 implies that bx  (1 qL)(1 eL)
and (1  qH)(1  eH)  bx, respectively.
Step 3: Existence of Equilibrium. This part of the proof is totally analogous to Step
3 of the proof of Proposition 2.
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